Financial
Complexity
The
financial crisis has told us that markets of finance are some form of
complex networks that no one can easily understand what has easily
gone out of control. Systemic
risk is not an isolated event but a particular situation of financial
networks which is let on its own dynamics. It is a rising property,
side effect of economic jargon which arises due to the complex
interaction and economic interests of market players. Study of data
and network science can help in shaping markets and institutions that
are more concrete, stable and better suited for benefit of society at
large. If big market players' economic influence is not considered
then financial regulation will have no meaning.
A
lot of part of financial system can be modelled as networks where
financial institutions are the nodes and contracts are links. We have
a directed and weighted graph here as links(e.g. Loan) can be
associated with weight and direction. Network Structural
properties(e.g. distribution of no. of links,community structures or
modularity that measures organization in communities) can be
described by statistics provided by Network theory and also it can
be used to determine the importance of financial institutions based
on certain criteria.
The
paper "The power to control" describes the application of
two different notions of centrality and controllability to concrete
case studies. Paper provide the results of one of the first network
analysis of the TARGET2 infrastructure for large payments in Europe.
It is shown how the nodes that drive the system are not necessarily
the hubs or those responsible for the largest volumes of
transactions. In a nutshell, in a network, due to multiple chains of
connections, it often happens that a small cog is able to move a
large cog. These notions are useful to devise concrete ways in which
regulators can try and control the well-functioning of certain
markets.
However,
one of the issues with financial networks is that often the structure
is unknown due to confidentiality issues. Indeed, it is in the
interest of individual institutions to keep their financial contracts
undisclosed. This however prevents the regulator to assess precisely
the systemic risk, which depends critically on the overall structure
of the network. The error in the estimation is a sort of "social
price of private confidentiality". The paper "Reconstructing
a credit network" sketches some of the methods that have been
recently developed in order to deal with this problem. It is possible
to estimate the macroscopic characteristics of a network as well as
its resilience starting from limited information on the existing
links. It is also possible to estimate financial interdependence
based on time series of certain market indices such as the spread of
credit default swaps associated to a given institution. These methods
will hopefully contribute to building more reliable Early Warning
Systems that detect the building up of financial instabilities.
The
bad news is that even if certain properties of network structures can
be estimated from partial information or from market indices time
series, a more fundamental issue lures at regulators from behind the
scenes. As outlined in the paper “Complex derivatives”, there are
many incentives at work for market players to engage in an intricate
web of complex derivative contracts that, overall constitutes in
itself a too big to fail entity that will always be rescued at with
public money. Because derivative contracts essentially amplify gain
and losses and because they can depend on the financial health of
other agents in the network, the resulting system is highly
non-linear and intrinsically unstable. We are not even yet able to
model the dynamics of its components and certainly very far from
being able to predict anything of its global dynamics. In a nutshell,
one possible view here is that derivatives, although can be used to
hedge risks, are actually many times used to take excessive risk at
the expenses of society at large, thus raising a serious moral hazard
issue. The challenge for regulators is really formidable here.
Network science seems a precondition for trying and understanding the
positive feedbacks that are at play in this complex system.
In
this respect, the paper “Network opportunities” argues that the
problem of the economic discipline so far has been precisely not to
be able to deal with these positive feedback. For various reasons,
both the econometric approach and the so-called Stochastic Dynamic
General Equilibrium (SDGE) approach are essentially linear and unable
to model the instabilities and regime shifts that financial markets
display so often. It is clear that better science alone will not
resolve economic crises, nor it will allow the precise prediction of
the economic or financial future. Certainly, however it seems to
provide genuinely new and promising tools to help regulators and
economists to understand and mitigate systemic risk.
References
:
1.
Nature Physics Journal, March 2013, Volume 9, 3 ppl119-197 : Focus on
Complex Networks in Finance
2.
Financial market as Complex Network - Dr. Simone Alfarano, Dr.
Albrecht Irle, Dr. Thomas Lux, Dr. Friedrich Wagner
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